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INTRODUCTION
It is not an uncommon tale: a person of color is pulled over or
stopped by a law enforcement officer, not because of a traffic infraction
or any legal violation, but because of the color of his skin.1 Although
aware that he has not committed a crime and that the stop is illegal, he
complies when the officer asks for identification because he has been
taught that the alternative may cost him his life.2 Do not become another
Philando Castile, another Michael Brown.3 Be compliant; keep your
hands up; do not give them a reason to shoot.4 The officer then takes the
identification and runs a warrant check. The officer finds an outstanding
warrant for an unpaid parking ticket and promptly arrests the individual.
1 THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, RESTORING A NAT’L CONSENSUS: THE NEED TO END RACIAL
PROFILING IN AMERICA, 1, 11 (2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20110630084904/http://www.civil
rights.org/publications/reports/racial-profiling2011/racial_profiling2011.pdf.
2 See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing W. E.
B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903); JAMES BALWDIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); TA-
NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015)).
3 Jasmine C. Lee & Haeyoun Park, In 15 High-Profile Cases Involving Deaths of Blacks, One
Officer Faces Prison Time, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/inter-
active/2017/05/17/us/black-deaths-police.html.
4 See TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015).
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From there, the officer searches the individual, his car, and belongings
where the officer finds incriminating evidence of a crime unrelated to the
purpose for which the individual was stopped. Should this evidence be
admitted into court when the initial stop was illegal? The intuitive re-
sponse is no because if that evidence is admissible, what is to stop police
officers from stopping an individual who is walking into a store to search
his person, or waking an individual up in the middle of the night to
search his home? It feels like an attack on a person’s way of life, an
attack on the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. It seems inher-
ently wrong to allow such a thing to happen; yet with the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Utah v. Strieff,5 this is the reality that the
United States finds itself.
What a person does in the privacy of her home, what she carries on
her person as she walks down the street, the conversations she has on her
phone while in a secluded area are all very personal, private matters. If
individuals were constantly subjected to random government intrusion, a
person’s behavior would look vastly different than its current manifesta-
tion. The right to privacy and to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures is of such high importance in the United States that it was codi-
fied in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.6 Yet in the more than
225 years since its ratification, the courts have continued to narrow an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.7
The Fourth Amendment protects one’s right to be free from “unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.”8 The judiciary has worked to enforce this
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring
courts to exclude evidence obtained by unconstitutional police conduct.9
This remedy to cure Fourth Amendment violations is known as the ex-
clusionary rule.10 Nevertheless, the exclusionary rule is subject to many
exceptions, one of which is the attenuation doctrine.11 Since its articula-
tion as a three-prong test in 1975,12 federal circuits have disagreed on
5 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock
and announce rule does not require suppression); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that a
brief stop initiated for the purpose of potentially criminal behavior is constitutional so long as it is
supported by reasonable suspicion); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (holding that evidence is
properly admitted if it would have inevitably been discovered had no constitutional violation taken
place).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059.
10 Id. at 2061.
11 Id.
12 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
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how to apply the test.13 The test looks at three factors to determine
whether evidence has been purged of its original taint: (1) the amount of
time that has elapsed between the illegal search or seizure and the time
the disputed evidence is found; (2) the presence of intervening circum-
stances between the illegal search or seizure and the procurement of the
disputed evidence; and (3) “particularly significant,” the purpose and fla-
grancy of the law enforcement official’s misconduct.14 With its decision
in Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court set forth the method by which to
apply the attenuation doctrine and declared that evidence obtained during
an illegal stop is nonetheless admissible if the officer discovers that the
stopped individual has a valid outstanding arrest warrant, regardless of
why the warrant was issued.15 The Court reasoned that the discovery of
the arrest warrant attenuated or diminished the connection between the
illegal stop and the discovery of evidence.16
This Comment argues that the Court misapplied the attenuation doc-
trine in Strieff, specifically in its application and interpretation of the
language “purposeful and flagrant” and explores the possible implica-
tions of this decision.17 First, Section I explains the Fourth Amendment
and the basic principles of law regarding searches and seizures, including
the exclusionary rule and attenuation doctrine. Then, Section II examines
the circuit court split prior to Utah v. Strieff and how each circuit inter-
preted the language “purposeful and flagrant.” Finally, Section III ana-
lyzes the issues with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “purposeful
and flagrant” in Utah v. Strieff and proposes a solution, which would
require the examination of statistical data to determine whether an of-
ficer’s misconduct is purposeful and flagrant. The use of statistics will
allow the courts to more easily justify their holdings as being consistent
with the reality of the social sphere; furthermore, parties would be af-
forded a much more methodical approach to proving purposefulness and
flagrancy.
13 Merry C. Johnson, Comment, Discovering Arrest Warrants During Illegal Traffic Stops:
The Lower Courts’ Wrong Turn in the Exclusionary Rule Attenuation Analysis, 85 MISS. L.J. 225,
237-38 (2016).
14 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (internal quotation marks omitted); Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04.
15 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 2063.
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT & EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment, passed by Congress on September 25,
1780, and ratified on December 15, 1791,18 reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.19
This section begins by defining what constitutes a search or a seizure,
continues by addressing the reasonableness inquiry, and concludes by
explaining Terry stops and the requirement of reasonable suspicion.
1. Searches & Seizures
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures of people and their property.20 A search occurs when a person’s
subjective expectation of privacy, which society must be willing to con-
sider objectively reasonable, is infringed upon.21 Thus, a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is a government intrusion into
one’s reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy.22 A search by a
government entity of an individual with anything less than a legitimate
expectation of privacy is not a search subject to the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.23
Freedom from unreasonable searches is increasingly valued in a
world where vast amounts of information can easily be accessed with a
press of a button.24 In February 2016, Apple fought against a federal
court order requiring the company to create a backdoor for its iPhones’
operating system that would allow the government to access information
18 Amendment IV, NAT’L CONST. CTR, https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/
amendments/amendment-iv (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20 Id.
21 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
22 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005).
23 Id.
24 See Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino Gun-
man’s iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/technology/apple-
timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html.
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on a previously locked and encrypted cell phone.25 The phone belonged
to the deceased shooter of the 2015 San Bernardino terrorist attack, in
which 14 people were killed and 22 others were seriously injured.26 Al-
though the FBI was able to access the information on the phone by other
means,27 Apple argued that complying with the order would “undermine
the very freedoms and liberty our government is meant to protect.”28
Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure is the “meaningful interfer-
ence with an individual’s possessory interest” in property,29 or restraint
on an individual’s liberty such that “a reasonable person would . . . be-
lieve[ ] he [i]s not free to leave.”30 Similar to the requirement that an
individual must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in order for a
search to be subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, an indi-
vidual challenging a seizure under the Fourth Amendment must have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her use of the property
seized.31 Thus, seizure of abandoned property cannot be subject to a
Fourth Amendment challenge.32
Further, a seizure of a person occurs if, after taking into account the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged seizure, a reasona-
ble person would be under the impression that he or she is not free to
ignore the officer’s request or to leave.33 Such a seizure may be effectu-
ated by means of physical restraint or by a show of authority such that a
person’s liberty is restrained.34 Thus, a consensual encounter between a
law enforcement officer and an individual is not a seizure for the pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment.35 Finally, the Fourth Amendment only
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures effectuated by gov-
ernment employees acting as an agent of the state, not against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures effectuated by private citizens.36
25 Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.apple.com/
customer-letter/.
26 Everything We Know About the San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation So Far, L.A.
TIMES, http://beta.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-san-bernardino-shooting-terror-investigation-
htmlstory.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
27 Alina Selyuhk, A Year After San Bernardino And Apple-FBI, Where Are We On Encryp-
tion?, NPR (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/12/03/504130977/
a-year-after-san-bernardino-and-apple-fbi-where-are-we-on-encryption.
28 Cook, supra note 25.
29 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
30 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 554 (1980)).
31 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
32 United States v. Welbeck, 145 F.3d 493, 498 (2d Cir. 1998).
33 Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003).
34 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
35 See id. at 20 n.16.
36 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980).
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2. Reasonableness
The Fourth Amendment only prohibits searches and seizures that are
deemed unreasonable.37 In determining what is reasonable, the Supreme
Court gives great weight to the “essential interest in readily administrable
rules.”38 Thus, a complex process to determine what is reasonable would
not suffice because of its inability to be easily implemented. Addition-
ally, what is reasonable depends upon the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure
itself.39 Accordingly, the constitutional reasonableness of a search or
seizure is a fact-specific determination despite the fact that it is an en-
tirely legal issue.40
To determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure, a court will
balance two factors: first, the public interest in conducting the search or
seizure as a means of promoting a legitimate government interest and,
second, an individual’s right to and expectation of security or privacy,
free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement.41 Effectively, the
court weighs the intrusion into an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights
against the government’s need for the search or seizure.42 To be reasona-
ble, the search or seizure must ordinarily be based on an individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing.43 Further, an officer’s subjective intent or mo-
tivation for conducting a search or seizure, whether motivated by a legiti-
mate government purpose or as a means of achieving a less legitimate
and more improper purpose, has no bearing on whether the search or
seizure was reasonable and, therefore, legal.44 Thus, reasonableness is, in
fact, an objective standard.
While the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s right to be free
from unreasonable searches or seizures, the Court has held that brief
stops initiated for the purpose of investigating “possibly criminal behav-
ior,” known as Terry stops, are constitutional so long as they are sup-
ported by reasonable suspicion.45 Reasonable suspicion is present when
an officer observes “unusual conduct” that leads him to reasonably be-
lieve, as a result of his experience as an officer, that criminal activity
37 Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
38 Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) (quoting Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
347 (2001)).
39 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
40 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-98 (1996).
41 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).
42 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
43 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
44 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006).
45 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 30-31 (1968).
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may be occurring.46 The officer must have “specific and articulable
facts” that would reasonably allow a stop for the purpose of investigation
to occur.47
B. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
When a search or a seizure is found to be unreasonable and thus,
illegal, the evidence obtained during that search or seizure is subject to
the exclusionary rule.48 The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction
of both tangible and testimonial evidence obtained during an unreasona-
ble search or seizure.49 However, the exclusionary rule does not apply in
all cases where a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred.50 The Su-
preme Court has laid out the circumstances in which the exclusionary
rule applies:
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice
system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circum-
stances recurring or systemic negligence.51
Thus, the benefits of the exclusion must outweigh its costs, which typi-
cally manifests itself in the possibility of allowing guilty and potentially
dangerous individuals go free.52 Given these high costs, an individual
seeking exclusion has a relatively high burden to meet.53 Additionally, an
exception exists whereby evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment may not be excluded if an officer acted in “good faith.”54
When an officer acts reasonably and in “good faith,” the officer will
continue to act the same way in future, similar circumstances.55 Accord-
ingly, when an offer acts in “good faith,” the exclusionary rule has no
deterrent effect,56 unlike the case in which an officer acts in bad faith.
46 Id. at 30.
47 Id. at 21.
48 See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536 (1988).
49 Id.
50 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
223 (1983)).
51 Id. at 144.
52 Id. at 141.
53 Id.
54 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538 (1975).
55 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976).
56 Id.
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Thus, the exclusionary rule serves as a powerful deterrent of police
misconduct.57
1. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
The exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence that is found as a
direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also to evidence secon-
dary or derivative in nature obtained as a result of information gained
from an illegal search or seizure.58 This doctrine, known as “the fruit of
the poisonous tree,” states that the illegality that taints and, therefore,
precludes the admission of direct evidence found as a result of an illegal
search or seizure, also taints and precludes the admission of any secon-
dary evidence found.59 Thus, the implications of a single unlawful search
or seizure may be far reaching. 
2. The Attenuation Doctrine
Although the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine generally ex-
cludes evidence that is a result of an illegal search or seizure, an excep-
tion to that doctrine arises when the evidence obtained is considered far
removed from the original illegality.60 The reasoning is that evidence
may be so far removed so as to be purged of the original taint, rendering
the evidence admissible.61 Since its articulation in Brown v. Illinois in
1975,62 the attenuation doctrine, as it is commonly known, requires that a
court consider three factors when determining whether the evidence in
dispute has been purged of the original taint: (1) the amount of time that
has elapsed between the illegal search or seizure and the time the dis-
puted evidence is found; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances
between the illegal search or seizure and the procurement of the disputed
evidence; and (3) “particularly significant,” the purpose and flagrancy of
the law enforcement official’s misconduct.63 The test evaluates the
causal connection between the official’s unconstitutional act and the sub-
sequent discovery of evidence.64
As more time passes between the initial misconduct and the discov-
ery of evidence, it becomes more likely that the first factor will favor
57 Herring, 555 U.S. at 139-40.
58 6 Search & Seizure § 11.4 (5th ed. 2017); 1 Federal Trial Handbook: Criminal § 33:8 (4th
ed. 2017).
59 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984).
60 Id. at 805.
61 Id.
62 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
63 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 Id. at 2061.
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attenuation.65 Attenuation in such a situation is favored because the more
time that has passed between the two events, the longer the taint from the
initial misconduct has the ability to dissipate. Additionally, the presence
of an intervening circumstance that interrupts the causal connection be-
tween the illegal misconduct and the discovery of evidence also favors
attenuation.66 When there exists an intervening circumstance, the circum-
stance blocks the initial illegality from reaching the newly discovered
evidence.67
However, what qualifies as an intervening circumstance is much less
clear and has led to conflicting interpretations. For example, the Court in
Brown found that the reading of a defendant’s Miranda rights was not
considered an intervening circumstance of significance.68 Yet the Court
found in another case that when a confession is “an act of free will [suffi-
cient] to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion,” it may be
considered an intervening circumstance.69 In Wong Sun, for example, de-
fendant was released on his own recognizance after being arrested in
connection with narcotics distribution charges.70 Several days later, de-
fendant voluntarily went to the office of the Narcotics Bureau to give a
statement.71 The Court held that connection between the arrest and the
subsequent statement had “become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint.”72
Finally, the more purposeful and flagrant an officer’s misconduct is,
the more likely the evidence will be found to be inadmissible.73 The final
factor is necessary because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter officer misconduct, and the more purposeful and flagrant the mis-
conduct, the more necessary deterrence becomes.74
In Brown, defendant Richard Brown’s motion to suppress was de-
nied in connection with a charge of murder.75 Three officers arrested
Brown at gunpoint outside of his apartment without a warrant or proba-
ble cause.76 The arresting officers conceded that they arrested Brown for
65 Id. at 2062.
66 Id. at 2061.
67 See United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 517 (7th Cir. 1997).
68 Brown, 422 U.S. at 604.
69 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963). This Comment later addresses in
detail how the circuit courts determined whether the existence of a warrant was considered an inter-
vening circumstance prior to the decision in Utah v. Strieff.
70 Id. at 475.
71 Id. at 491.
72 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
73 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
74 Id.
75 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 596 (1975).
76 Id. at 591.
10
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the purpose of questioning him as part of an investigation into the murder
of a man Brown was acquainted.77 During the fourteen hours he was held
in custody by the officers, Brown was warned of his Miranda rights and
eventually made incriminating statements regarding the murder of his
acquaintance.78 The first incriminating statement was made approxi-
mately one hour after Brown was arrested,79 while the second incriminat-
ing statement was made approximately seven hours after his arrest.80
Applying the factors previously laid out, the Court held that the
lower courts erred in deeming the evidence admissible.81 First, the Court
reasoned that an insignificant amount of time had passed between the
illegal arrest and Brown’s first confession, weighing in favor of inadmis-
sibility.82 Next, the Court found that there had been “no intervening
event of significance whatsoever,”83 holding that the reading of Miranda
rights “alone and per se” cannot always make the act of confession atten-
uated enough from the original taint to render admissibility.84 Finally,
evaluating the final factor, the Court found that the officer misconduct
“had a quality of purposefulness” in that “the impropriety of the arrest
was obvious, . . . the two detectives . . . repeatedly acknowledge[ing], in
their testimony, that the purpose of their action was ‘for investigation’ or
for ‘questioning[,]’” therefore weighing in favor of inadmissibility.85
The Court found that the manner in which the officers arrested Brown
was “calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.”86 As a result,
the evidence should have been suppressed given that all factors weighed
against attenuation.87
II. “PURPOSEFUL AND FLAGRANT”
A. PRIOR TO UTAH V. STRIEFF : A CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT
Prior to its 2016 decision in Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court had
not addressed whether the attenuation doctrine applied in a situation
where a valid arrest warrant is discovered after an unlawful investigatory
stop but before the discovery of incriminating evidence, nor had it ad-
77 Id. at 592.
78 Id. at 594-95.
79 Id. at 594.
80 Id. at 595-96.
81 Id. at 605.
82 Id. at 604.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 603.
85 Id. at 605.
86 Id.
87 Id.
11
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dressed how to apply it if it was warranted.88 However, at the lower
level, circuit and state courts differed on how the attenuation doctrine
should be applied where a valid arrest warrant was found after an unlaw-
ful investigatory stop but before the discovery of incriminating evi-
dence.89 Namely, courts differed on whether to consider the discovery of
a valid arrest warrant an intervening circumstance.90 Additionally, the
courts also took different approaches on whether to consider the officer’s
initial misconduct purposeful or flagrant, whether or not that determina-
tion should weigh in favor of attenuation, and what weight to give the
factor.91
1. “Purposeful & Flagrant” Among Courts That View an Arrest
Warrant as an Intervening Circumstance Sufficient to
Attenuate the Connection Between the Initial
Misconduct and the Discovery of Evidence
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits held that the discovery of an arrest
warrant is an intervening circumstance that attenuates the taint of the
original illegal stop.92 When applying the Brown test, these courts placed
great emphasis on the second factor, the existence of intervening circum-
stances.93 As a result, the courts deemphasized both (i) the temporal
proximity between the illegal stop and the discovery of evidence and (ii)
the purposefulness and flagrancy of the law enforcement officer’s
misconduct.94
In United States v. Faulkner, for example, the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress drugs found during a
traffic stop.95 Faulkner and his girlfriend had been pulled over for an
alleged traffic violation.96 While pulled over, the officer discovered that
Faulkner had an outstanding arrest warrant.97 Faulkner was then arrested
pursuant to the warrant.98 During a search incident to arrest, officers
found a large amount of cash on his person and a drug dog was subse-
88 Johnson, supra note 13, at 238.
89 Id. at 237.
90 Id. at 237-38.
91 See, e.g., United States v. Faulkner, 636 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Green,
111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997).
92 See Faulkner, 636 F.3d at 1014-17; Green, 111 F.3d at 521-23.
93 Johnson, supra note 13, at 238-39.
94 Id. at 239.
95 Faulkner, 636 F.3d at 1012.
96 Id. at 1013.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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quently called in.99 After the dog alerted officers to drugs in the car,
defendant admitted that half of the drugs were his and the rest belonged
to his co-conspirator.100 Claiming that he did not commit a traffic viola-
tion and was thus illegally stopped, Faulkner filed a motion to suppress
the evidence recovered and the statements he made regarding his
culpability.101
Applying the Brown test, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rea-
soned that the discovery of the arrest warrant was considered an inter-
vening circumstance per the second factor and thus weighed in favor of
attenuation.102 In evaluating the temporal proximity between the illegal
stop and the discovery of evidence, the court stated that when the inter-
vening circumstance is the discovery of an arrest warrant, the “first factor
. . . is less relevant.”103
Finally, in determining whether the officer’s misconduct was pur-
poseful and flagrant, the court acknowledged that the third factor is the
“most important factor” because it directly corresponds to the function of
the exclusionary rule, deterring police misconduct.104 Nevertheless, the
court stated that the application of the exclusionary rule does not serve its
purpose if the conduct, although improper, was not committed with the
intention of “benefit[ting] the police at the expense of the suspect’s pro-
tected rights.”105 Given this, the court looked at “whether the impropriety
of the misconduct was obvious or whether the official knew that his con-
duct was improper but engaged in it anyway and whether the misconduct
was committed in the hopes that something might turn up.”106 The court
reasoned that, although Faulkner disputed the stop, the traffic violation
was a close call and the officer’s decision to stop Faulkner was not a
flagrant violation of Faulkner’s Fourth Amendment rights.107 Thus, the
court held that the discovery of the arrest warrant was an intervening
circumstance, which sufficiently attenuated the connection between the
illegal stop and the discovery of evidence.108 As a result, Faulkner’s mo-
tion to suppress was correctly denied.109
Similarly, in U.S. v. Green, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that discovery of an arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance
99 Id. at 1013-14.
100 Id. at 1014.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1015.
103 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 Id. at 1016.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1016-17.
108 Id. at 1014, 1017.
109 Id. at 1017.
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that sufficiently attenuated the taint between an illegal stop and the dis-
covery of incriminating evidence.110 In Green, the lower court denied
defendant’s motion to suppress in connection with charges for the pos-
session of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a
firearm by a felon.111 Officers in Green noticed Green’s car driving in
front of them and thought they had seen Green’s vehicle parked in front
of the home of a wanted felon, Mark Williams, the night before.112 The
officers followed Green’s car to a home and blocked the car in the drive-
way because they believed that the car’s occupants either included the
wanted man or the occupants knew about his whereabouts.113 The of-
ficers then stopped Green and asked him and his brother, the other occu-
pant of the car, for identification.114 Shortly thereafter, the officers
discovered an outstanding arrest warrant for Green’s brother and subse-
quently arrested him.115 According to the officers’ testimony, Green then
consented to a search of the car, during which the officers found crack
cocaine and a gun.116 Green filed a motion to suppress the cocaine and
gun, arguing that both were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amend-
ment rights.117 Green argued that although the officers were justified in
stopping them to ascertain whether Williams was in the car, once the
officers realized that Williams was not present, they were required to let
them go immediately.118 By continuing to hold the gentlemen to search
for outstanding warrants, the officers violated Green’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights.119
Applying the Brown factors, the Seventh Circuit found that the dis-
covery of the arrest warrant for Green’s brother was an intervening cir-
cumstance that made a “compelling case for the conclusion that the taint
of the original illegality is dissipated.”120 In analyzing the temporal prox-
imity factor, the court found that as only five minutes had elapsed be-
tween the illegal stop and the car search, the evidence weighed in favor
of suppression because the amount of time was too minimal to allow for
the original taint to sufficiently dissipate.121 Nevertheless, the court
110 United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 517 (7th Cir. 1997).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 518.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 521-22.
121 Id. at 521.
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stated that the temporal proximity factor was “not dispositive on the
question of taint.”122
Finally, in analyzing the last factor, the court found that the attenua-
tion doctrine does not serve its deterrent function when the officer’s ac-
tion, though erroneous, “was not undertaken in an effort to benefit the
police at the expense of the suspect’s protected rights.”123 Here, the court
found that the purpose of the stop was not to seek evidence against the
Greens, but to obtain evidence against Williams.124 Further, there was no
evidence of bad faith on the part of the officers.125 Thus, the purposeful-
ness and flagrancy factor weighed in favor of attenuation. Given the
above, the court held that Green was not entitled to suppression and the
evidence was properly admitted.126
2. “Purposeful & Flagrant” Among Courts That Do Not View an
Arrest Warrant as an Intervening Circumstance Sufficient to
Attenuate the Connection Between the Initial
Misconduct and the Discovery of Evidence
The Sixth Circuit has held that the discovery of an arrest warrant is
not an intervening circumstance that breaks the causal connection be-
tween the original illegal stop and the discovery of incriminating evi-
dence.127 When applying the three-prong Brown test, the court gave
equal weight to all factors.128
For example, in United States v. Gross, an officer found the defen-
dant slumped over in his running, legally parked vehicle.129 Upon seeing
Gross, the officer blocked the vehicle and shone his spotlight on the car
before approaching.130 The officer requested Gross’ information, ran a
warrant check, and discovered an outstanding warrant for Gross’ ar-
rest.131 The officer subsequently arrested Gross and found an illegal
handgun during a search at the station.132 Gross filed a motion to exclude
the gun from evidence.133 He argued that the officer blocking his vehicle
122 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
123 Id. at 523.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 406 (6th Cir. 2011).
128 See id. at 402-06.
129 Id. at 396.
130 Id. at 396-97.
131 Id. at 397.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 397-98.
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constituted an illegal seizure because the officer lacked probable
cause.134
Applying the first factor, temporal proximity, the Sixth Circuit deter-
mined that little time had elapsed between the illegal seizure and the
discovery of the firearm, weighing in favor of exclusion.135 As for the
second factor, the presence of intervening circumstances, the court held
that the discovery of an arrest warrant when the initial stop had no legal
purpose is a relevant factor, but not dispositive of whether the illegal stop
and the discovery of evidence is attenuated enough to dissipate the origi-
nal taint from the stop.136 The court reasoned that:
To hold otherwise would create a rule that potentially allows for a new
form of police investigation, whereby an officer patrolling a high
crime area may, without consequence, illegally stop a group of re-
sidents where he has a “police hunch” that the residents may: 1) have
outstanding warrants; or 2) be engaged in some activity that does not
rise to a level of reasonable suspicion.137
Here, the discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant “resulted from
means that are indistinguishable from the illegal stop.”138 Thus, the ini-
tial taint had not been purged, which weighed in favor of exclusion.139
Finally, applying the third factor, the purposefulness and flagrancy
of the misconduct, the court held that while the officer’s misconduct was
“disheartening” given that he had blocked in another car at least once
before, the officer’s stop was not effectuated in an attempt to seek evi-
dence against Gross.140 Additionally, there was not sufficient evidence to
prove that the officer knew he lacked probable cause.141 Thus, the pur-
posefulness and flagrancy of the officer’s misconduct did not have sig-
nificant weight in the attenuation analysis.142 Evaluating all the factors
together, the court held that the discovery of the firearm and the illegal
stop were not sufficiently attenuated and the motion to suppress should
have been granted.143
134 Id. at 399.
135 Id. at 406.
136 Id. at 404.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 405.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 405-06.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 406.
143 Id.
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As evidenced by the decisions in Faulkner,144 Green,145 and
Gross,146 circuit courts differed greatly on whether to consider the dis-
covery of a valid arrest warrant as an intervening circumstance sufficient
to attenuate and purge the taint of the illegal stop. While the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits held that the discovery of a valid arrest warrant is an
intervening circumstance, the Sixth Circuit held that it did not constitute
an intervening circumstance.147
B. UTAH V. STRIEFF
The primary issue the Court addressed in Utah v. Strieff was
whether the discovery of a valid arrest warrant after an unlawful investi-
gatory stop, but before the discovery of incriminating evidence, was at-
tenuated enough to warrant suppression of the evidence.148 With its
decision in Strieff, the Supreme Court effectively settled the circuit court
split. The Court, in a 5-3 decision149 authored by Justice Thomas and
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito,
held that the discovery of an arrest warrant after an illegal stop suffi-
ciently attenuates the connection between the illegality of the initial stop
and the discovery of incriminating evidence such that suppression is not
warranted.150 In Strieff, an officer stopped defendant after he was seen
exiting a home that was under surveillance and whose occupants were
suspected of dealing drugs.151 The law enforcement officer asked Strieff
what he was doing at the home and requested identification.152 Upon
relaying the information to a dispatcher, the officer discovered that
Strieff had an outstanding warrant for his arrest as a result of a traffic
violation.153 Pursuant to the warrant, the officer arrested and searched
Strieff.154 As a result of his search, the officer found a bag of
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.155 Strieff moved to suppress
144 United States v. Faulkner, 636 F.3d 1009, 1015 (8th Cir. 2011).
145 United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521, 522 (7th Cir. 1997).
146 Gross, 662 F.3d at 405.
147 See Faulkner, 636 F.3d at 1014-17; Green, 111 F.3d at 521-23. Contra Gross, 662 F.3d at
406.
148 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).
149 Justice Antonin Scalia passed away on February 13, 2016, four months before this case
was decided, leaving eight remaining Justices and a vacant seat on the Supreme Court bench. See
Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. Times (Feb. 13,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
150 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064.
151 Id. at 2059-60.
152 Id. at 2060.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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the evidence discovered incident to his arrest, arguing that the evidence
was the product of an unlawful investigatory stop.156
Applying the Brown factors, the Court held that the discovery of the
arrest warrant sufficiently attenuated the connection between the illegal
stop and the discovery of incriminating evidence.157 Suppression, there-
fore, was unwarranted.158 Similar to decisions by the lower courts in the
Seventh159 and Eighth160 Circuits, the Court held that the existence of a
valid arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance sufficient to attenu-
ate the connection between the illegal stop and the discovery of the in-
criminating evidence.161 While doing so, the Court also deemphasized
the temporal proximity between the two events and the purposefulness
and flagrancy of the conduct.162
First, the Court found that the temporal proximity factor supported
exclusion of the evidence because the drugs were found only minutes
after Strieff was unlawfully stopped.163 Second, the Court found that the
presence of intervening circumstances supported admissibility.164 The
Court reasoned that because the warrant was valid, predated the arrest,
and was entirely unconnected to the stop, the subsequent arrest and dis-
covery of evidence was a lawful search derived from the arrest
warrant.165
Finally, the Court found that the purposeful and flagrant factor sup-
ported admissibility because the officer was “at most[,] negligent” and
made “good-faith mistakes” prior to and during his encounter with
Strieff.166 The Court conceded that the officer’s first “mistake” was that
he had not observed when Strieff entered the house and therefore was
unaware of how much time he had spent there.167 Thus, the officer
lacked sufficient evidence to conclude that Strieff was a “short-term visi-
tor who may have been consummating a drug transaction.”168 Secondly,
the officer erred by demanding that Strieff speak with him rather than
merely asking him to do so.169 The officer’s stated purpose of the stop
156 Id.
157 Id. at 2064.
158 Id.
159 United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521-23 (7th Cir. 1997).
160 United States v. Faulkner, 636 F.3d 1009, 1014-17 (8th Cir. 2011).
161 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064.
162 See id. at 2062-63.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 2062.
165 Id. at 2062-63.
166 Id. at 2063.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
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was to investigate what activities were occurring in the house and the
Court stated that “[n]othing prevented [the officer] from approaching
Strieff simply to ask.”170 Nevertheless, the Court stated that there was
“no indication that [the] unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recur-
rent police misconduct.”171 The Court instead found that the stop was an
“isolated instance of negligence” and that it was not a “suspicionless
fishing expedition in the hope that something would turn up.”172 Further,
the search itself was lawful and necessary to ensure officer safety be-
cause once the officer was authorized to arrest Strieff pursuant to the
warrant, the officer was also authorized to search Strieff.173 The Court
added that “[n]either the officer’s alleged purpose nor the flagrancy of
the violation rise to a level of misconduct to warrant suppression.”174
Accordingly, after balancing the factors, the Court found that the discov-
ery of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on Strieff was attenu-
ated enough from the initial illegal stop to not warrant suppression.175
III. PURPOSEFUL & FLAGRANT: HOW THE COURT APPLIED THE
BROWN FACTOR AND HOW IT SHOULD APPLY THE FACTOR
GOING FORWARD
A. THE SUPREME COURT MISAPPLIED THE ATTENUATION DOCTRINE,
PARTICULARLY IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF “PURPOSEFUL AND
FLAGRANT,” AND THE IMPLICATIONS ARE FAR-REACHING
AND POTENTIALLY DEVASTATING
The Court in Strieff misapplied the attenuation doctrine factors, par-
ticularly in its interpretation of the purposeful and flagrant factor. Paral-
leling previous decisions by circuit courts that viewed the existence of a
warrant as an intervening circumstance, the Court deemphasized the pur-
poseful and flagrant factor, effectively dismissing it as favoring admissi-
bility while still claiming the necessity of evaluating all three Brown
factors. The Court took the time to lay out all three factors and apply
them to the case at hand, but did not give sufficient weight to each in its
analysis. Rather, the Court emphasized the presence of an intervening
factor: the existence of a valid arrest warrant. However, if emphasis on a
particular factor was warranted at all, the Court should have emphasized
the purposeful and flagrant factor. This is because, as stated in its opin-
170 Id. (internal brackets omitted).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 2063-64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
173 Id. at 2063.
174 Id. at 2064.
175 Id. at 2063.
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ion, the factor “reflects th[e] rationale [that the exclusionary rule exists to
deter police misconduct] by favoring exclusion only when the police
misconduct is most in need of deterrence—that is, when it is purposeful
or flagrant.”176
Here, the Court made a determination regarding the purposefulness
and flagrancy of the officer’s actions without any in depth reasoning or
evidence to provide support for its statements. In doing so, the Court set
a dangerous precedent that has implications that are both far-reaching
and potentially devastating to the personal liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution. Although Strieff is a white man, the consequences of this
decision reach far beyond him and are likely to have the most devastating
impact on communities of color. As Justice Sotomayor stated in a pas-
sionate dissent, joined in part by Justice Ginsburg, “The white defendant
in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be violated . . . .”177
By finding that the officer’s actions were not “a part of any systemic
or recurrent police misconduct,”178 the Court implies that it either misun-
derstands the realities of the social and political atmosphere plaguing the
nation’s communities of color or it is ignorant of the numerous incidents
of police misconduct and killings that have occurred within the last few
years.179 As stated by Justice Kagan in her dissent, which was joined by
Justice Ginsburg, “[T]he majority is less willing to see [the] problem for
what it is.”180 In 2016, 963 people were shot and killed by police and in
2017, that number rose to 987 deaths.181 Of those 963 deaths in 2016,
631 of those people were not fleeing the scene, and in 2017, of the 987
people killed, 597 occurred when the suspect did not attempt to flee the
scene.182 Further, many of the illegal stops effectuated by police officers
are “the product of institutionalized training procedures.”183 In this case,
as pointed out by Justice Sotomayor, the officer did not suspect that
176 Id.
177 Id. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 2063 (majority opinion).
179 See Fatal Force, THE WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/
police-shootings-2017/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2017); Fatal Force, THE WASH. POST, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018). This is
particularly interesting given that the majority opinion is authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the
only sitting African American Justice on the Supreme Court while the impassioned dissent was
authored by the Court’s only sitting Latin American Justice, Justice Sonia Sotomayor.
180 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
181 Fatal Force, THE WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/po-
lice-shootings-2016/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018); Fatal Force, THE WASH. POST, https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2017/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018).
182 Fatal Force, THE WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/po-
lice-shootings-2016/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018); Fatal Force, THE WASH. POST, https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2017/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018).
183 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Strieff had done anything wrong; he unfortunately happened to be the
first person to leave a house that the officer believed was the source of
drug trafficking.184
By claiming that the officer was “at most[,] negligent,”185 the Court
invites officer misconduct. As noted by Justice Kagan, with the Court’s
decision in Strieff, an officer who wants to stop an individual for investi-
gative reasons but is lacking the necessary reasonable suspicion may now
stop that individual and “[s]o long as the target is one of the many mil-
lions of people in this country with an outstanding arrest warrant, any-
thing the officer finds in a search is fair game for use in a criminal
prosecution.”186 The Court dismissed this very argument by Strieff, stat-
ing that it “think[s] that . . . [continued or increased officer misconduct]
is unlikely.”187 Yet the Court provides no justification for this statement,
only that it is not persuaded by Strieff’s arguments.188 The Court implies
that when an officer has acted negligently, the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule does not outweigh its “substantial social costs.”189
However, as noted by Justice Sotomayor, negligent officers are “perhaps
the most in need of education” and the exclusion of evidence illegally
obtained gives them an “incentive to err on the side of constitutional
behavior.”190 Here, the officer’s stop was “calculated to procure evi-
dence,”191 a clear indication that the stop was purposeful. Further, as
noted by Justice Kagan, “[t]he impropriety of the stop was obvious.”192
The Court offers no information on how similar decisions dismissing of-
ficer misconduct have shaped the likelihood of future misconduct.
The Court goes on to state that “such wanton conduct would expose
officers to civil liability,”193 as if such civil suits have not already been
filed with the result being that officer misconduct still persists at an
alarming rate.194 Such civil suits are “expensive, time-consuming, not
184 Id. at 2065.
185 Id. at 2063 (majority opinion).
186 Id. at 2074 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 2064 (majority opinion).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 2061.
190 Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982)).
191 Id. at 2066.
192 Id. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal brackets omitted).
193 Id. at 2064 (majority opinion).
194 See Alan Feuer, In Police Misconduct Lawsuits, Potent Incentives Point to a Payout, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/nyregion/police-misconduct-lawsuit-
settlements.html; Fatal Force, THE WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/na-
tional/police-shootings-2016/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018).
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readily available, and rarely successful.”195 Additionally, most cases that
are successful rarely have plaintiffs who have “collected more than nom-
inal damages.”196 Although the vast majority of officers are not ill-
willed, there exists “widespread racial disparity in stop, citation, search,
and arrest rates.”197 Additionally, in a study on the racial disparities in
police traffic stops, it was found that the bar for searching black and
Hispanic drivers is lower than for searching white drivers.198 These sta-
tistics are indicative of the fact that people of color are “disproportionate
victims” of the “indignity” of these types of illegal stops.199
The discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant should not be viewed
as an intervening circumstance that attenuates the connection between
the illegal stop and the unearthing of incriminating evidence because the
evidence ought to still be considered “fruit of the poisonous tree,” there-
fore rendering the evidence inadmissible. It is inherently wrong to allow
the admissibility of evidence to depend on a supposed luck of the draw.
As noted by Justice Sotomayor, the States and Federal Government have
documented over 7.8 million outstanding warrants, “the vast majority of
which appear to be for minor offenses,” a number that likely fails to
capture that actual amount of outstanding warrants in the country.200 In
the town of Ferguson, Missouri, with a population of only 21,000, 16,000
individuals had outstanding warrants against them.201 At the time of
Strieff’s arrest, Utah had over 180,000 misdemeanor warrants in its
database.202 Thus, the officer’s discovery of the warrant was “not some
intervening surprise that he could not have anticipated.”203 By holding
that the discovery of an arrest warrant is an intervening circumstance
sufficient to attenuate the connection between an illegal stop and the dis-
covery of incriminating evidence, ill-willed officers will have nothing to
deter them from stopping any person on the street that they deem fit for
195 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 610 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
196 Id.
197 Emma Pierson, et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across
the United States 1, 15 (Stan. Open Policing Project, Working Paper, 2017), https://5harad.com/
papers/traffic-stops.pdf.
198 Id.
199 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 96-136 (2015)).
200 Id. at 2068 (citing DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGU-
SON POLICE DEP’T 46, 55, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/
2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf).
201 Id. (citing DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON PO-
LICE DEP’T 46, 55, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/
03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf).
202 Id. at 2066.
203 Id.
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harassment in the hopes of finding an outstanding warrant to justify their
stop and subsequent arrest and search. Additionally, as a result of this
decision, impoverished communities will likely be disproportionately af-
fected due to the fact that warrants are issued for violations as minor as
failing to pay a fine.204
Finally, the Court completely ignores the fact that while deterrence
is an important reason to suppress evidence, it is not the only reason
suppression should be warranted. Officer misconduct that goes unpun-
ished generates a feeling of uneasiness among the general public and
creates an atmosphere of distrust and fear.205 Officers are given a great
deal of deference and power in regards to their interactions with the gen-
eral public. If they are not held accountable for their actions but are still
tasked with protecting and serving a population who fears them, the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of law enforcement officers are destined to
decline.206
B. CONSULTING STATISTICAL DATA IS THE PROPER APPROACH TO
DETERMINE WHETHER A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER’S
MISCONDUCT IS “PURPOSEFUL AND FLAGRANT”
Although one may disagree with the Court’s outcome in Utah v.
Strieff, lower courts may still apply the attenuation doctrine to future
cases similarly situated and reach a more just outcome. To properly ap-
ply the attenuation doctrine, the lower courts should consider and inte-
grate statistical data provided by the parties into their opinions to provide
support for their holding, specifically when analyzing the purposeful and
flagrant factor of the Brown attenuation doctrine’s three-factor test. This
will not only provide for more transparent reasoning and an increase in
the likelihood that courts will come to a just outcome, but could also help
relieve the uneasiness felt by the general public after a controversial de-
cision, such as that in Utah v. Strieff.
While the Supreme Court has not specifically defined the terms
“purposeful” or “flagrant,” Merriam Webster defines “purposeful” as
having a purpose such that an action is intentional,207 and “flagrant” as
204 Id. at 2064.
205 OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUILDING TRUST
BETWEEN THE POLICE AND THE CITIZENS THEY SERVE: AN INTERNAL AFFAIRS PROMISING PRACTICES
GUIDE FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2009), http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/buildingtrust
.pdf.
206 See Brief of the ACLU and the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 6, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373), 2016 WL
403751.
207 Purposeful, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/purpose
ful (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
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“conspicuously offensive” and “so obviously inconsistent with what is
right or proper as to appear to be a flouting of law or morality.”208 Fur-
ther, the Court states that to be flagrant, a violation must be “more severe
. . . than the mere absence of proper cause for the seizure.”209 What
makes something obvious or more severe, however, is difficult to deter-
mine objectively. What is obvious seems to be a matter of opinion rather
than one of fact. Thus, flagrancy is a subjective matter that requires ex-
planation and, if possible, quantification. The best way to demonstrate or
quantify flagrancy is to use statistical data as support for one’s
statements.
Additionally, although the Supreme Court has not defined “pur-
poseful or flagrant,” the Second Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Tenth Cir-
cuit have consistently held that police misconduct rises to the level of
purposeful or flagrant when there are two elements present.210 First, the
impropriety of the conduct must be obvious or the officer knew at the
time that his conduct was improper or unconstitutional yet engaged in it
anyway.211 Second, the “the misconduct was investigatory in design and
purpose and executed ‘in the hope that something might turn up.’”212
The majority opinion in Utah v. Strieff never explicitly overruled the
use of statistical information by parties to provide support for their argu-
ments. The Court merely neglects to use these powerful tools in support
of its reasoning for its opinion. Instead, the majority appears to operate
on an intuition-based system about whether the officer’s illegal conduct
rose to a level deemed flagrant. Similar to how the standard for determin-
ing what is reasonable is based on the totality of the circumstances, the
standard for flagrancy should be grounded in the same principle. By con-
sidering statistics provided by the parties, courts can place officer mis-
conduct in the broader context of society at large. For example, to prove
that an officer’s misconduct is purposeful or flagrant, a party may bring
in data that shows how often a particular police department’s stops are
not supported by reasonable suspicion or data showing an officer’s his-
tory of stopping individuals who have subsequently complained about
being stopped without cause. Thus, courts should allow parties to submit
and rely on statistical data to support their arguments and the courts
208 Flagrant, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/flagrant (last
visited Nov. 20, 2016).
209 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064.
210 United States v. Murphy, 703 F.3d 182, 192 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fox,
600 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir.
2006))).
211 Id.
212 Id. (quoting United States v. Fox, 600 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United
States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 2006))).
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should consider that persuasive evidence of purposeful and flagrant con-
duct by the law enforcement officer. When decisions are based solely on
intuition or broad statements without explanation or reasoning, one is
less likely to view the decision as well reasoned. By considering statisti-
cal data and using those numbers to form a basis for their opinions,
courts would make their reasoning more transparent and heighten the
legitimacy of their decisions. Still, the impetus is on the parties to bring
such data to the courts’ attention.
The effectiveness of such an approach can be seen in Justice
Sotomayor’s impassioned dissent in Utah v. Strieff. Rather than making
dismissive, blanket statements, Justice Sotomayor uses statistics to lend
support to her statements and force the majority to take notice.213 To
provide support for her contention that the discovery of an arrest warrant
for an individual who is unlawfully stopped is not an unforeseeable
event, Justice Sotomayor cites the 180,000 misdemeanor warrants in
Utah’s database.214 In defending her contention that outstanding warrants
are not only common in Utah but also in the nation, Justice Sotomayor
cites a number of reports that quantify the number of people with arrest
warrants for particular types of violations, such as when a person with a
traffic ticket misses a fine payment or when a person on probation drinks
alcohol or breaks curfew.215 Finally, to prove that law enforcement of-
ficers often use outstanding warrants as a reason to stop people without
cause, Justice Sotomayor references investigative reports by the Justice
Department that show just that.216
Suggesting that courts use statistical data to provide support for their
decisions that an officer’s conduct is flagrant, does not equate to requir-
ing an officer who has illegally stopped an individual and subsequently
found an outstanding arrest warrant to let that individual go free. Rather,
the use of statistical data would help to draw the line between what ought
to be considered admissible evidence and what is not. This Comment
does not contest that an officer has the right to search an individual pur-
suant to a lawful arrest to guarantee his safety. What the officer may not
do, however, is use whatever evidence has been found on that individual
to charge him or her with a crime for which he or she was not originally
arrested.
While lower courts must rule in accordance with the case law set
forth by the Supreme Court, lower courts may be able to distinguish the
facts in Strieff from those in future cases. Although Strieff settles the
213 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 2068.
216 Id.
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question of whether the discovery of a warrant is considered an interven-
ing circumstance sufficient to attenuate the connection between the ille-
gality of the initial stop and the discovery of the incriminating evidence,
the case does not mandate a method of arguing for or against attenuation
based on the “purposeful and flagrant” factor. Thus, parties should set
forth statistical data in their briefs to prove such purposefulness and fla-
grancy. Additionally, should lower courts encounter cases that are factu-
ally similar to Utah v. Strieff, those courts may more adequately justify
their holdings by considering and using the statistical data provided by
the parties. This will eliminate the contention that the court’s holding is
not based in reality or on solid reasoning.
C. POLICE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO COLLECT DATA
ON THE INDIVIDUALS THEY STOP, THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP,
AND THE OUTCOME: THE NYPD’S STOP-AND-FRISK
POLICY AS A MODEL
Although statistical data would work to defeat accusations that the
Court is out of touch with the reality of the political and social sphere,
sufficient statistical data does not always exist to support a finding that
an officer’s action is purposeful or flagrant. To aid courts and parties in
the implementation of such an approach, police departments should be
required to collect data on who they stop; the purpose of the stop; a
description of the individual; and the outcome of the stop—whether the
individual was released from temporary detention, issued a citation, or
arrested.
As a result of a 2013 decision which determined that the New York
Police Department’s (“NYPD”) implementation of their stop-and-frisk
policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of minori-
ties,217 the NYPD has been in the process of implementing a data collec-
tion process,218 upon which this Comment’s proposal is based.
According to the order, each time an NYPD officer stops an individual,
the officer is required to report what occurred during the stop, including
the above-mentioned description of the individual, purpose of the stop,
and the outcome of the stop.219
217 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
218 See Al Baker, City Police Officers Are Not Reporting All Street Stops, Monitor Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/nyregion/nypd-stop-and-frisk-monitor
.html.
219 Finest Message from Police Commissioner to All Commands (Mar. 2, 2015), https://
www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/investigations_pdf/20150302_finest-message-stop-frisk-
pursuant-to-floyd.pdf.
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While progress has been made in the two years since the beginning
of the NYPD’s overhaul of its stop-and-frisk policy, a court-appointed
monitor overseeing the changes to the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policies
found that officers were still failing to report all of the conducted
stops.220 This highlights one of the main difficulties that will arise as a
result of requiring police officers to report the stops they have carried
out: slow compliance. Another issue will be the cost of training officers
to comply with a new data reporting policy. Still, these obstacles are a
relatively small price to pay in order to ensure that citizens’ constitution-
ally guaranteed liberties are protected.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Utah v. Strieff is a controversial one, the
consequences of which have yet to be seen but whose implications are
far-reaching and potentially devastating. Prior to the Court’s decision in
Utah v. Strieff, lower courts differed on whether to consider the existence
of a valid arrest warrant as an intervening circumstance relevant to the
Brown attenuation doctrine analysis. However, with its decision in Utah
v. Strieff, the Court effectively settled the split between circuits, holding
that the existence of a valid arrest warrant is an intervening circumstance
that attenuates the connection between an illegal stop and the discovery
of evidence.
Still, the Court ultimately misapplied the attenuation doctrine, par-
ticularly in regards to its analysis of the “purposeful and flagrant” factor.
By dismissing the officer’s action as not being purposeful or flagrant and
not a part of systemic or recurring police misconduct, the Court implied
that it either misunderstood the plights of communities of color or was
ignorant of the rampant police misconduct and killings that have plagued
the nation over the last few years.
To ensure that the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals across
the nation are protected, it is necessary for lower courts to reexamine its
analysis and application of the attenuation doctrine and the purpose of
the exclusionary rule. To do this effectively, courts should use statistical
data provided by the parties to decide whether an officer’s misconduct is
purposeful or flagrant. In doing so, parties would make their arguments
stronger and courts would provide more transparency and insight into
their decision making processes, heightening their legitimacy.
Finally, police departments should be required to collect data on the
stops they effectuate because this is the best way to aid courts and parties
220 Baker, supra note 218.
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in implementing this new approach. Although implementation of such a
process may be initially slow and costly, it is a small price to pay to
ensure citizens’ constitutional rights are protected.
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